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Abstract
We improve the robustness of deep neural nets to adversarial attacks by using an
interpolating function as the output activation. This data-dependent activation remarkably
improves both generalization and robustness towards adversarial attacks. In the CIFAR10
benchmark, we raise the accuracy of the Projected Gradient Descent adversarial training
from ∼ 46% to ∼ 69% for ResNet20. When we combine this data-dependent activation
with total variation minimization on adversarial images and training data augmentation, we
achieve an improvement in accuracy by 38.9% for ResNet56 under the strongest attack of
the Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method. We further provide an intuitive explanation of
our defense by analyzing the geometry of the feature space. For reproducibility, the code is
made available at: https://github.com/BaoWangMath/DNN-DataDependentActivation.
1 Introduction
The adversarial vulnerability [34] of deep neural nets (DNN) threatens their applicability in
security critical tasks, e.g., autonomous cars [1], robotics [11], DNN-based malware detection
systems [26, 10]. Since the pioneering work by Szegedy et al. [34], many advanced adversarial
attack schemes have been devised to generate imperceptible perturbations to sufficiently fool the
DNN [9, 25, 7, 37, 14, 4, 8]. Not only are adversarial attacks successful in white-box attacks, i.e.,
when the adversary has access to the DNN’s parameters, but they are also successful in black-box
attacks, i.e., without access to network parameters. Adversarial attacks are transferable in the
sense that a perturbed image meant to be misclassified by one DNN also has a significant chance
to be misclassified by another DNN [28]. Due to this transferability, it is adversaries can attack
neural nets without knowing the network parameters (i.e. blackbox) [19, 6]. There even exist
universal perturbations that can imperceptibly perturb any image and cause misclassification
for any given network [22]. And recently, there has been much work on defending against these
universal perturbations [2].
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In this work, we defend against adversarial attacks by changing the DNN’s output activation
to a manifold-interpolating function in order to seamlessly utilize the training data to perform
inference. By combining our defense with the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [21] adversarial
training, total variation minimization (TVM), and training data augmentation, we show state-of-
the-art results for the CIFAR10 benchmark.
2 Related Work
Defensive distillation was recently proposed to increase the stability of DNN [27], and a related
approach [35] cleverly modifies the training data to increase robustness against black-box attacks
and adversarial attacks in general. To counter adversarial perturbations, Guo et al. [12], propose
to use image transformation, e.g., bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, TVM, and image
quilting. A similar idea of denoising the input was later explored in [23], where the authors
divide the input into patches, denoise each patch, and then reconstruct the image. These input
transformations are intended to be non-differentiable, thus making adversarial attacks more
difficult, especially for gradient-based attacks. Another denoising approach is introduced by Liao
et al. [18], where they propose a high-level representation guided (HGD) denoiser – the idea is
that while perturbations seem small in the original and adversarial images, these perturbations are
amplified in higher representations. Transformation-based defenses have also been proposed by
Xie et al. [38], and Luo et al. [20]. Song et al. [33], noticed that small adversarial perturbations
shift the distribution of adversarial images far from the distribution of clean images. Therefore,
they proposed to purify the adversarial images by PixelDefend. And Prakash et al. [29], also
seek to examine image statistics in order to construct an adversarial defense – in their work, they
introduce Pixel Deflection where they force images to match statistics of natural images. Lee et
al. [17], have also used the distribution of images to detect adversarial examples. Adversarial
training is another family of defense methods to enhance the stability of DNNs [9, 21, 24]. In
particular, the PGD adversarial training achieves state-of-the-art resistance to the available
attacks [21]. GANs are also employed for adversarial defense [31]. In [3], the authors proposed
an approximated gradient to attack the defenses that are based on the obfuscated gradient.
Instead of using the softmax function as DNN’s output activation, Wang et al. [36], utilize
a class of non-parametric interpolating functions. This is a combination of both deep and
manifold learning which causes the DNN to utilize the geometric information of the training
data sufficiently. The authors show a significant amount of generalization accuracy improvement,
and the results are more stable when one only has a limited amount of training data.
3 DNN with Data-Dependent Activation
In this section, we summarize the architecture, training, and testing procedures of the DNN with
the data-dependent activation [36]. For the standard DNN with softmax activation, the training
and testing are shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively. In the kth iteration of training, given a
mini-batch of training data X,Y, we perform:
Forward propagation: Transform X into features by the DNN block (a combination of
convolutional layers, nonlinearities, etc.), and then feed the output into the softmax activation
to obtain the predictions Y˜, i.e.,
Y˜ = Softmax(DNN(X,Θk−1),Wk−1).
Then the loss is computed (e.g., cross entropy) between Y and Y˜: L .= LLinear = Loss(Y, Y˜).
Backpropagation: Update weights (Θk−1, Wk−1) by gradient descent with learning rate γ
Wk = Wk−1 − γ ∂L
∂Y˜
· ∂Y˜
∂W
, Θk = Θk−1 − γ ∂L
∂Y˜
· ∂Y˜
∂X˜
· ∂X˜
∂Θ
.
Once the model is optimized, with optimal parameters being (Θ,W), the predicted labels for
testing data X are
Y˜ = Softmax(DNN(X,Θ),W).
Wang et al [36] proposed to replace the data-agnostic softmax by an interpolating function
defined below.
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Figure 1: Training and testing procedures of the DNN with softmax and WNLL functions as the
output activation layer. (a) and (b) show the training and testing steps for the standard DNN,
respectively; (c) and (d) illustrate the training and testing procedure of the WNLL activated
DNN, respectively.
3.1 Manifold Interpolation - A Harmonic Extension Approach
Let X = {x1,x2, · · · ,xn} be a set of points on a high dimensional manifold M ⊂ Rd and
Xte = {xte1 ,xte2 , · · · ,xtem} (“te" for template) be a subset of X which are labeled with label
function g(x). We want to interpolate a function u that is defined onM and can be used to label
the entire dataset X. The harmonic extension is a natural approach to find such an interpolating
function, which is defined by minimizing the following Dirichlet energy functional
E(u) = 1
2
∑
x,y∈X
w(x,y) (u(x)− u(y))2 , (1)
with the boundary condition
u(x) = g(x), x ∈ Xte,
where w(x,y) is a weight function, chosen to be Gaussian: w(x,y) = exp(− ||x−y||2σ2 ) with σ
being a scaling parameter. The Euler-Lagrange equation for Eq. (1) is{∑
y∈X (w(x,y) + w(y,x)) (u(x)− u(y)) = 0 x ∈ X/Xte
u(x) = g(x) x ∈ Xte. (2)
3
By solving the linear system Eq. (2), we obtain labels u(x) for the unlabeled data x ∈ X/Xte.
This interpolation becomes invalid when the labeled data is tiny, i.e., |Xte|  |X/Xte|. To
resolve this issue, the weights of the labeled data is increased in the Euler-Lagrange equation,
which gives 
∑
y∈X (w(x,y) + w(y,x)) (u(x)− u(y))+( |X|
|Xte| − 1
)∑
y∈Xte w(y,x) (u(x)− u(y)) = 0 x ∈ X/Xte
u(x) = g(x) x ∈ Xte.
(3)
The solution to Eq. (3) is named weighted nonlocal Laplacian (WNLL), denoted as WNLL(X,Xte,Yte).
Shi et al. [32], showed that WNLL converges to the solution of the high dimensional Laplace-
Beltrami equation. For classification, g(x) is the one-hot label for the example x.
3.2 Training and Testing of the DNN with Data-Dependent Activation
Function
For a standard neural net N, we denote the WNLL activated one as N-WNLL, e.g., the WNLL
activated ResNet20 is named ResNet20-WNLL. In both training and testing of the DNN-WNLL,
we need to reserve a small portion of data/label pairs, denoted as (Xte,Yte), to interpolate the
label for new data. We name the reserved data (Xte,Yte) as the template. Directly replacing
softmax by WNLL has difficulties in back propagation, namely the true gradients ∂L∂Θ and
∂L
∂WB
(here L .= LWNLL = Loss(Yˆ, Y ), as shown in Fig. 1(c)) are difficult to compute since WNLL
defines an implicit function. Instead, to train the DNN-WNLL, a proxy via an auxiliary neural
nets (Fig. 1(c)) is employed. On top of the original DNN, we add a buffer block (a fully connected
layer followed by a ReLU), and followed by two parallel branches, WNLL and the linear (fully
connected) layers. The auxiliary DNN can be trained by alternating between training the DNN
with linear and WNLL activations, respectively. The training loss of the WNLL activation is
backpropped via a straight-through gradient estimator [3, 5], e.g., in the kth iteration, we use
the following approximated gradient descent to update WB only (when backpropagating the
training loss LWNLL we freeze the remaining part except the buffer block),
WkB = W
k−1
B − γ
∂LWNLL
∂Yˆ
· ∂Yˆ
∂Xˆ
· ∂Xˆ
∂WB
(4)
≈Wk−1B − γ
∂LLinear
∂Y˜
· ∂Y˜
∂Xˆ
· ∂Xˆ
∂WB
,
where ∂L
Linear
∂Y˜
and ∂L
WNLL
∂Yˆ
is the loss computed through the computation graphs of the two
different activation. In the approximation of Eq. (4), we simply change the value of LLinear to
that of LWNLL.
At test time, we remove the linear classifier from the neural nets and use the DNN and buffer
blocks together with WNLL to classify new data (Fig. 1 (d)); here for simplicity, we merge the
buffer block to the DNN block. For a given set of testing data X, and the labeled template
{(Xte,Yte)}, the predicted labels for X is given by
Y˜ = WNLL(DNN(X,Xte,Θ),Yte).
4 Adversarial Attacks
We consider three benchmark attacks: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9], Iterative
FGSM (IFGSM) [16], and Carlini-Wagner’s L2 (CW-L2) [7] attack. We denote the classifier
defined by the DNN as y˜ = f(θ,x) for a given instance (x, y). FGSM searchs the adversarial
image x′ with a bounded perturbation by maximizing the loss L(x′, y) .= L(f(θ,x′), y), subject
to the l∞ perturbation constraint ||x′ − x||∞ ≤  with  being the attack strength. We can
approximately solve this constrained optimization problem by using the first order approximation
of the loss function i.e., L(x′, y) ≈ L(x, y) +∇xL(x, y)T · (x′ − x). Under this approximation,
the optimal adversarial image is
x′ = x +  sign · (∇xL(x, y)) . (5)
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IFGSM iterates FGSM to generate the enhanced attack, i.e.,
x(m) = x(m−1) +  · sign
(
∇xL(x(m−1), y)
)
, (6)
where m = 1, · · · ,M , x(0) = x and x′ = x(M), with M be the number of iterations.
Both FGSM and IFGSM belong to fix-perturbation attacks. Moreover, we consider a zero-
confidence attack due to Carlini and Wagner. For a given image-label pair (x, y), and ∀t 6= y,
CW-L2 searches the adversarial image that will be classified to class t by solving the optimization
problem
min
δ
||δ||22, (7)
subject to
f(x + δ) = t, x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
where δ is the adversarial perturbation (for simplicity, we ignore the dependence of θ in f).
The equality constraint in Eq. (7) is hard to handle, so Carlini et al. consider the surrogate
g(x) = max
(
max
i6=t
(Z(x)i)− Z(x)t, 0
)
, (8)
where Z(x) is the logit vector for an input x, i.e., output of the neural nets before the output
layer. Z(x)i is the logit value corresponding to class i. It is easy to see that f(x + δ) = t is
equivalent to g(x + δ) ≤ 0. Therefore, the problem in Eq. (7) can be reformulated as
min
δ
||δ||22 + c · g(x + δ), (9)
subject to
x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
where c ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier.
By letting δ = 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x, Eq. (9) can be written as an unconstrained optimization
problem. Moreover, Carlini et al. introduce the confidence parameter κ into the above formulation.
Above all, the CW-L2 attack seeks the adversarial image by solving the following problem
min
w
||1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)− x||22 + c· (10)
max
{
−κ,max
i 6=t
(Z(
1
2
(tanh(w)) + 1)i)− Z(1
2
(tanh(w)) + 1)t
}
.
The Adam optimizer [15] can solve this unconstrained optimization problem efficiently. All
three attacks clip the values of the adversarial image x′ to between 0 and 1.
In practice, we apply the following clipped IFGSM
x(m) = Clipx,α
{
x(m−1) +  · sign
(
∇xL(x(m−1), y)
)}
, (11)
where α is an additional parameter to be specified in the following experiments.
4.1 Attack the DNN with WNLL Activation
For a given mini-batch of testing images (X,Y) and template (Xte,Yte), we denote the DNN-
WNLL as Y˜ = WNLL(Z({X,Xte}),Yte), where Z({X,Xte}) is the composition of the DNN
and buffer blocks as shown in Fig. 1(c). By ignoring dependence of the loss function on the
parameters, the loss function for DNN-WNLL can be written as L˜(X,Y,Xte,Yte) .= Loss(Yˆ,Y).
The above attacks for DNN-WNLL are formulated below.
• FGSM
X′ = X +  · sign
(
∇XL˜(X,Y,Xte,Yte)
)
. (12)
5
• IFGSM
X(m) = ClipX,α[X
(m−1)+ (13)
 · sign
(
∇XL˜(X(m−1),Y,Xte,Yte)
)
],
where m = 1, 2, · · · , N ; X(0) = X and X′ = X(N).
• CW-L2
min
W
||1
2
(tanh(W) + 1)−X||22 + c ·max[−κ, (14)
max
i6=t
(Z(
1
2
(tanh(W)) + 1)i)− Z(1
2
(tanh(W)) + 1)t],
where i are the logit values of the input images X, t are the target labels.
In the above attacks, ∇XL˜ is required to generate the adversarial images. In the DNN-WNLL,
this gradient is difficult to compute. As shown in Fig. 1 (c), we approximate ∇XL˜ in the following
way
∇XL˜ = ∂L
WNLL
∂Yˆ
· ∂Yˆ
∂Xˆ
· ∂Xˆ
∂X˜
· ∂X˜
∂X
(15)
≈ ∂L
Linear
∂Y˜
· ∂Y˜
∂Xˆ
· ∂Xˆ
∂X˜
· ∂X˜
∂X
,
again, in the above approximation, we set the value of LLinear to the value of L˜.
Based on our numerical experiments, the batch size of X has minimal influence on the
adversarial attack and defense. In all of our experiments, we choose the size of both mini-batches
X and the template to be 500.
5 Defense by Interpolating Function, TVM, and Training
Data Augmentation
To defend against adversarial attacks, we first combine the data-dependent activation with input
transformation and with training data augmentation. We train ResNet56 [13] and ResNet56-
WNLL, respectively, on the original training data, the TV minimized training data, and a
combination of the previous two. Moreover, in testing, we apply the TVM [30] used by [12], with
the same setting, to transform the adversarial images to boost classification performance. The
basic idea of TVM is to reconstruct the simplest image z from the sub-sampled image, X  x
with X the mask filled by a Bernoulli binary random variable, by solving
min
z
||(1−X) (z− x)||2 + λTV · TV2(z),
where λTV > 0 is the regularization constant.
We apply the three attack schemes mentioned above to attack ResNet56 and ResNet56-WNLL.
For IFGSM, we run 10 iterations of Eqs. (6) and (13) with α = 0.1 to attack the DNN with
two different output activations, respectively. For the CW-L2 attack (Eqs. (10, 14)), in both
scenarios we set the parameters c = 10 and κ = 0, and run 10 iterations of the Adam optimizer
with learning rate 0.01. Figure 2 depicts three randomly selected images (horse, automobile,
airplane) from the CIFAR10 dataset, as well as the perturbed images from applying different
attacks on ResNet56 and ResNet56-WNLL, and the TV minimized ones. All attacks successfully
fool the classifiers to classify any of them correctly. Figure 2 (a) shows that the perturbations
resulted from FGSM attack with  = 0.02 is almost imperceptible. However, both FGSM and
IFGSM attacks are powerful in fooling DNNs. Figure 2 (b) shows the corresponding images of
(a) with a stronger attack,  = 0.08. With a larger , the adversarial images become more noisy.
The TV minimized images of Fig. 2 (a) and (b) are shown in Fig. 2 (c) and (d), respectively.
TVM removes a significant amount of information from the original and the adversarial images.
Meanwhile, it also makes it harder for humans to classify them.
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5.1 Numerical Results
5.1.1 Transferability of the Adversarial Images
We utilize the training strategy used in [36] to train the neural nets. To test the transferability,
we classify the adversarial images by using ResNet56 with the opponent activation. We list the
mutual classification accuracy on adversarial images resulting from using FGSM or IFGSM in
Table. 1. The adversarial images crafted by attacking ResNet56 with two types of activation
functions are both transferable, as the mutual classification accuracy on adversarial images ( 6= 0)
is significantly lower than testing on the clean images ( = 0). For both FGSM and IFGSM, the
stronger attack (in the sense of bigger ) is adapted to the opponent activation function, as the
mutual classification accuracy decreases dramatically as  increases. IFGSM not only fools its
underlying model completely, but also significantly decreases the accuracy of the opponent neural
nets. The mutual classification results for the CW-L2 attack is shown in Table. 2, where Exp-I
denotes classifying adversarial images resulted from attacking ResNet56-WNLL by ResNet56,
and Exp-II denotes the opposite. Training data augmentation can defend CW-L2 attack very
effectively.
Table 1: Mutual classification accuracy on the adversarial images crafted by using FGSM and IFGSM
to attack ResNet56 and ResNet56-WNLL. (Unit: %)
Attack Method Training data  = 0  = 0.02  = 0.04  = 0.06  = 0.08  = 0.1
Classification accuracy of ResNet56 on adversarial images crafted by attacking ResNet56-WNLL
FGSM Original data 93.0 69.8 56.9 44.6 34.6 28.3
FGSM TVM data 88.3 51.5 37.9 30.1 24.7 20.9
FGSM Original + TVM data 93.1 78.5 70.9 64.6 59.8 55.8
IFGSM Original data 93.0 5.22 5.73 6.73 7.55 8.55
IFGSM TVM data 88.3 7.00 6.82 8.30 9.28 10.7
IFGSM Original + TVM data 93.1 27.3 28.6 29.5 29.1 29.4
Classification accuracy of ResNet56-WNLL on adversarial images crafted by attacking ResNet56
FGSM Original data 94.5 65.2 49.0 39.3 32.8 28.3
FGSM TVM data 90.6 45.9 30.9 22.2 16.9 13.8
FGSM Original + TVM data 94.7 78.3 68.2 61.1 56.5 52.5
IFGSM Original data 94.5 3.37 3.71 3.54 4.69 6.41
IFGSM TVM data 90.6 7.88 7.51 7.58 8.07 9.67
IFGSM Original + TVM data 94.7 34.3 33.4 33.1 34.6 35.8
Table 2: Mutual classification accuracy on the adversarial im-
ages crafted by using CW-L2 to attack ResNet56 and ResNet56-
WNLL. (Unit: %)
Training data Original data TVM data Original + TVM data
Exp-I 52.1 43.2 80.0
Exp-II 59.7 41.1 80.1
Table 3: Testing accuracy on the adversarial/TVM adversarial
CIFAR10 dataset. The testing accuracy with no defense is in red
italic; and the results with all three defenses are in boldface. (Unit:
%)
Training data Original data TVM data Original + TVM data
ResNet56 4.94/32.2 11.8/54.0 15.1/52.4
ResNet56-WNLL 18.3/35.2 15.0/53.9 28/54.5
5.1.2 Adversarial Defense
Figure 3 plots the results of adversarial defense by combining the WNLL activation, TVM, and
training data augmentation. Panels (a) and (b) show the testing accuracy of ResNet56 with
and without defense on CIFAR10 data for FGSM and IFGSM, respectively. It is seen that as
 increases, the testing accuracy decreases rapidly. FGSM is a relatively weak attack, and the
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Table 4: Testing accuracy on the adversarial/TVM adversarial CIFAR10 dataset. The testing
accuracy with no defense is in red italic; and the results with all three defenses are in boldface.
(Unit: %)
Attack Method Training data  = 0  = 0.02  = 0.04  = 0.06  = 0.08  = 0.1
ResNet56
FGSM Original data 93.0 36.9/19.4 29.6/18.9 26.1/18.4 23.1/17.9 20.5/17.1
FGSM TVM data 88.3 27.4/50.4 19.1/47.2 16.6/43.7 15.0/38.9 13.7/35.0
FGSM Original + TVM data 93.1 48.6/51.1 42.0/47.6 39.1/44.2 37.1/41.8 35.6/39.1
IFGSM Original data 93.0 0/16.6 0/16.1 0.02/15.9 0.1/15.5 0.25/16.1
IFGSM TVM data 88.3 0.01/43.4 0/42.5 0.02/42.4 0.18/42.7 0.49/42.4
IFGSM Original + TVM data 93.1 0.1/38.4 0.09/37.9 0.36/37.9 0.84/37.6 1.04/37.9
ResNet56-WNLL
FGSM Original data 94.5 58.5/26.0 50.1/25.4 42.3/25.5 35.7/24.9 29.2/22.9
FGSM TVM data 90.6 31.5/52.6 24.5/49.6 20.2/45.3 17.3/41.6 14.4/37.5
FGSM Original + TVM data 94.7 60.5/ 55.4 56.7/52.0 55.3/48.6 53.2/45.9 50.1/43.7
IFGSM Original data 94.5 0.49/16.7 0.14/17.3 0.3/16.9 1.01/16.6 0.94/16.5
IFGSM TVM data 90.6 0.61/37.3 0.43/36.3 0.63/35.9 0.87/35.9 1.19/35.5
IFGSM Original + TVM data 94.7 0.19/38.5 0.3/39.4 0.63/40.1 1.26/38.9 1.72/39.1
accuracy remains above 20.5% even with the most potent attack ( = 0.1). Meanwhile, the
defense raises the accuracy to 43.7%. Figure 3 (b) shows that IFGSM fools ResNet56 near
completely even with  = 0.2. The defense maintains the accuracy above 38.5%, 54.5% under the
CW-L2 and IFGSM attacks, respectively (see Tables. 3 and 4). Compared to the state-of-the-art
defensive methods on CIFAR10, PixelDefend, our approach is much simpler and faster. Without
adversarial training, we have shown our defense is more robust to FGSM and IFGSM attacks
under the strongest attack than PixelDefend [33]. Moreover, our defense strategy is additive to
adversarial training and many other defenses including PixelDefend.
To analyze the contribution from each component of the defensive strategy, we separate
the three parts and list the testing accuracy in Tables. 3 and 4. Performing TVM on the
adversarial images cannot defend FGSM attacks except when the training data contains the
TV minimized images. For instance, when we attack the model by FGSM with  = 0.02, the
accuracy on the adversarial images for ResNet56 and ResNet56-WNLL are 36.9% and 58.5%,
respectively, provided the models are trained on the original training data. The accuracy reduces
to 19.4% and 26.0% when testing on the TV minimized adversarial images. For ResNet56, the
accuracy raises to 50.4% and 51.1% when the model is trained on the TVM and augmented data,
respectively. For ResNet-WNLL, the accuracy increases to 52.6% and 55.4%, respectively. The
WNLL activation improves testing accuracy of adversarial attacks significantly and persistently.
Augmented training can also improve the stability consistently.
IFGSM fools the ResNet56-WNLL near completely, as the accuracy is always less than or
close to 1%. These results verify the efficacy of using the approximated gradient, i.e., Eq. (15),
in attacking the neural nets.
5.1.3 Analysis of the Geometry of Features
We consider features’ geometry of the original and adversarial images. We randomly select 1000
training and 100 testing images from the airplane and automobile classes, respectively. We apply
two visualization strategies for ResNet56: (1) Apply the principle component analysis (PCA) to
reduce the 64D features from the layer before the softmax to 2D, and (2) we add a 2 by 2 fully
connected (FC) layer before the softmax, then utilize the 2D features output from this newly
added layer; we verify that the newly added layer does not change the performance of ResNet56,
as shown in Fig. 4, and the training and testing performance remains essentially the same.
Figure 5 (a) and (b) show the 2D features generated by ResNet56 with the additional FC layer
for the original and adversarial testing images, respectively, where we generate the adversarial
images by using FGSM ( = 0.02). Before adversarial perturbation (Fig. 5 (a)), there is a line
that can separate the two classes very well. The small perturbation mixes the features and
there is no linear classifier that can easily separate these two classes (Fig. 5 (b)). The first two
principle components (PCs) of the 64D features of the clean and adversarial images are shown
in Fig. 5 (c) and (d), respectively. Again, the PCs are well separated for clean images, while
adversarial images causes overlap.
The bottom charts of Fig. 5 depict the first two PCs of the 64D features output from the
layer before the WNLL. The distributions of the unperturbed training and testing data are the
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Algorithm 1 PGD Adversarial Training of the DNN-WNLL
Input: Training set: (data, label) pairs (X,Y).
Output: An optimized DNN-WNLL, denoted as DNNWNLL.
for iter = 1, . . . , N (where N is the number of alternating steps.) do
//PGD adversarial training of the left branch: DNN with linear activation.
Train DNN + Linear blocks, and denote the learned model as DNNLinear.
Partition the training data into M1 mini-batches, i.e., (X,Y) =
⋃M1
i=1(Xi,Yi).
for epoch1 = 1,. . . , N1 (where N1 is the number of epochs in training DNN + Linear
blocks.) do
for i = 1,. . . ,M1 do
//Attack the input images by IFGSM.
for iter1 = 1, . . . , NIFGSM (where NIFGSM is the number of iterations of IFGSM
attack.) do
Update the training image Xi = Xi +  · sign (∇XiL),
where L is the loss of the prediction by DNN + Linear blocks w.r.t the ground
truth labels Yi.
Backpropagate the classification error of the adversarial images.
//PGD adversarial training of the right branch: DNN with WNLL activation.
Split (X,Y) into training data and template, i.e., (X,Y) .= (Xtr,Ytr)
⋃
(Xte,Yte).
Partition the training data into M2 mini-batches, i.e., (Xtr,Ytr) =
⋃M2
i=1(X
tr
i ,Y
tr
i ).
for epoch2 = 1,. . . , N2 (where N2 is the number of epochs in training DNN with WNLL
activation.) do
for i = 1, . . . ,M2 do
//Attack the input training images by IFGSM.
for iter1 = 1, . . . , NIFGSM (where NIFGSM is the number of iterations of IFGSM
attack.) do
Update the training image Xtri = Xtri +  · sign
(
∇Xtri L˜
)
,
where L˜ is the loss of the prediction by DNN with WNLL activation w.r.t the
ground truth labels Ytri .
Backpropagate the classification error of the adversarial images.
same, as illustrated in panels (e) and (f). The new features are better separated which indicates
that DNN-WNLL are more accurate and more robust to small random perturbation. Panels (g)
and (h) plot the features of the adversarial and TV minimized adversarial images in the test set.
The adversarial attacks make the features move towards each other and TVM helps to eliminate
the outliers. Based on our computation, the interpolating function on features shown in panels
(g) and (h) are significantly more accurate than the softmax classifier as shown in panel (d). The
fact that the adversarial perturbations change the features’ distribution was also noticed in [33],
and [18].
6 PGD Adversarial Training with Data-Dependent Activa-
tion Function
Image transformation based adversarial defense has been broken recently by circumventing the
obfuscated gradient [3]. To train a neural nets that is most resistant to adversarial attacks,
Madry et al. [21], incorporate the adversarial perturbation into the empirical risk function
E(x,y)∼D [L(x, y, θ)], where D is the collection of the pairs of training images and labels, and
θ represents the parameters of the neural nets. The idea of PGD adversarial training is that
instead of feeding samples from D directly into the loss L, we use the adversary to perturb the
input first, and then we end up with the following saddle point problem
min
θ
ρ(θ) = min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ,x + δ, y)
]
, (16)
where δ is the adversarial perturbation. To make the problem (Eq. (16)) solvable, the interior
maximization problem is relaxed to a strong adversarial attack, say IFGSM. It is argued
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in [3], that PGD adversarial training achieves the best resistance to adversarial attacks for
CIFAR10 classification. We extend the PGD adversarial training to DNN-WNLL by applying
the approximated gradient, Eq. (15), to approximately resolve the interior maximization problem.
We summarize the PGD adversarial training of DNN-WNLL in Algorithm 1.
6.1 Numerical Results
We consider PGD adversarial training, respectively, for the ResNet20 and ResNet20-WNLL.
Again, we train the ResNet20 with two types of activation, where we follow the strategy used
in [36], and where all the hyper-parameters in Algorithm 1 are referred. To approximate
maxδ∈S L(θ,x + δ, y), we apply the IFGSM attack with α = 8/255 in Eqs. (11, 13).
First, we fixed the attack strength  = 1/255 and vary the number of IFGSM iterations. As
shown in Fig. 6 (a), the accuracy of ResNet20 with both activations decreases as the number
of iteration increases. The vanilla ResNet20’s accuracy decays much faster than the ResNet20-
WNLL. The difference is ∼ 23% when 10 iterations of IFGSM is applied. Second, we fixed the
IFGSM iteration to be 10 and vary  from 0 to 8/255 with step size 1/255. As shown in Fig. 6
(b), for different nonzero attack strengths, PGD adversarial training of the ResNet20-WNLL has
∼ 23% higher accuracy than the vanilla one consistently.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, by analyzing the influence of adversarial perturbations on the geometric structure
of the DNN’s features, we propose to defend against adversarial attacks by using a data-
dependent activation function. We further show our defenses are additive to other defenses,
namely total variation minimization, training data augmentation, and projected gradient descent
adversarial training. Results on ResNet20 and ResNet56 with CIFAR10 benchmark reveal that
these defenses improve robustness to adversarial perturbation significantly. Total variation
minimization simplifies the adversarial images, which is very useful in removing adversarial
perturbation. The data-dependent activation framework raises the accuracy of PGD adversarial
training around 23% under different attack strengths. An interesting direction to explore is to
combine these methods with other denoising methods to remove adversarial perturbation.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Samples from CIFAR10. Panel (a): from the top to the last rows show the original,
adversarial images by attacking ResNet56 with FGSM and IFGSM ( = 0.02); and by attacking
ResNet56-WNLL. Panel (b) corresponding to those in panel (a) with  = 0.08. Charts (c) and
(d) corresponding to the TV minimized images in (a) and (b), respectively.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3:  v.s. accuracy without defense, and defending by WNLL activation, TVM and
augmented training. (a) and (b) plot results for FGSM and IFGSM attack, respectively.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Epochs v.s. accuracy of ResNet56 on CIFAR10. (a): without the additional FC layer;
(b): with the additional FC layer.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure 5: Visualization of the features learned by DNN with softmax ((a), (b), (c), (d)) and
WNLL ((e), (f), (g), (h)) activation functions. (a) and (b) plot the 2D features of the original
and adversarial testing images; (c) and (d) are the first two principle components of the 64D
features for the original and adversarial testing images, respectively. Charts (e), (f) plot the first
two components of the training and testing features learned by ResNet56-WNLL; (g) and (h)
show the two principle components of the adversarial and TV minimized adversarial images for
the test set.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: (a): #IFGSM iterations v.s. accuracy for the ResNet20 and the ResNet20-WNLL
trained with PGD adversarial training. (b): v.s. accuracy for the ResNet20 and the ResNet20-
WNLL trained with PGD adversarial training.
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